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ABSTRACT
The world is continually demanding more effective and intelligent solutions and
strategies to combat adversary groups across the cyber defense landscape. Cyber Threat
Intelligence (CTI) is a field within the domain of cyber security that allows for
organizations to utilize threat intelligence and serves as a tool for organizations to
proactively harden their defense posture. However, there is a large volume of CTI and it
is often a daunting task for organizations to effectively consume, utilize, and apply it to
their defense strategies.
In this thesis we develop a machine learning solution, named RedAI, to
investigate whether open-source intelligence (OSINT) can be effectively integrated into a
working approach that accurately classifies cyber threat intelligence. By focusing on
open-source and easily available resources, RedAI demonstrates how to use the
Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) (OASIS, 2017) language to objectify,
collect, and integrate intelligence and align it to the MITRE ATT&CK framework
(MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise, 2021). To test the accuracy of this solution, machine
learning models were built using training data and then further tested with test data to
determine the model's effectiveness at classifying unknown threat intelligence. The
results showed that RedAI could, with high accuracy, use OSINT cyber threat
intelligence data to build a machine learning model and then classifying unknown test
threat intelligence. Based off these findings, it is apparent that organizations have the
ability to leverage OSINT and advanced solutions to augment their cyber defense
posture.

vii

1
Part I
Introduction

2
1. INTRODUCTION
In today’s cyber world, it is evident how difficult it is to prevent attacks. Advanced
Persistent Threats (APTs) have grown their capabilities to factors that make it hard to
detect and investigate security breaches. The cyber security space is an increasingly
complex industry, which reflects the growing threat landscape. Today, adversaries have
developed advanced tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that allow them to
dynamically change their posture while evading commonplace defense mechanisms
(Recorded Future, 2019).
In the threat environment today traditional cyber defense mechanisms no longer
suffice. Adversary behaviors have become industry-grade and require matching advanced
mechanisms by organizations to effectively mitigate risk across their threat landscape
(Bromander, 2017). By strategically incorporating cyber threat intelligence (CTI)
practices, an organization can enable itself to make proactive, informed, data-backed
decisions to combat APTs. While understanding the benefits of CTI is often accepted
across the industry, applying it in practice can be a difficult and inefficient task. Threat
intelligence is often overwhelming and historically does not follow standardized formats.
Because of this, consuming and sharing threat intelligence can be difficult, which in
return can cause organizations to forego its use. By applying effective technological
methods like machine learning and ontologies, utilization of threat intelligence can
become a viable strategy for cyber threat mitigation (Crowdstrike, Kurt Baker, 2021).
An ontology is a set of concepts and categories in a subject area or domain that shows
their properties and the relations between them (Gronberg, 2019). Implementing a cyber
threat intelligence ontology has the following challenges:
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•

Lack of methods to define relationships between layers of intelligence to leverage
a wholistic and useable viewpoint of attack scenarios. Analysis of siloed
information without use case relationships is not enough for organizations to
proactively prepare for wide and evolving threats.

•

Non-standardized objectivation of intelligence information and data constructs
leading to hardships in consumption and sharing of information. Since
organizations have not agreed on a standardized representation of CTI, it makes it
difficult to consume their intelligence with one another, which has proven to be
essential in fighting APTs.

•

Data overload due to the volume of information being captured. Adversary TTPs
create a vast amount of information making it difficult for security analysts to
manually analyze, demanding a more automated and efficient solution.

This thesis introduces a machine learning approach to cyber threat intelligence that
highlights the benefits CTI can provide when machine learning practices are used to
analyze and classify open-source intelligence (OSINT). This work evaluates different
strategies and use-cases to find efficient and real-world focused methods to proactively
mitigate threats. While doing so, explicit focus has been placed on incorporating and
utilizing industry standards like MITRE ATT&CK and STIX to call attention to the
importance of effective and structured strategies for intelligence consumption and
sharing.
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis aims to answer the following research questions:
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1. How can the MITRE ATT&CK framework serve organizations as a cyber
threat intelligence (CTI) ontology?
2. Can open-source intelligence (OSINT) be a viable method for collecting and
consuming cyber threat intelligence (CTI)?
3. Can machine learning prove to be an accurate and efficient method for
harnessing the benefits of a cyber threat intelligence ontology?
To answer these questions, this thesis demonstrates a working solution developed with a
cyber threat intelligence focus by processing open-source intelligence data using a
machine learning pipeline.

1.2 METHODOLOGY
For this thesis, we developed a working solution called RedAI. RedAI is built with a
microservice focused design that can silo each of its components into programmatic
services. RedAI was developed using Python 3 with accompaniment from the Scikit
Learn (Scikit-Learn) and Pandas (Pandas) Python libraries for machine learning and data
representation functionality. The cyber threat intelligence ontology was developed in
parallel from the works and findings of the MITRE ATT&CK framework (The MITRE
Corporation, 2021). Open-source intelligence data from the MITRE ATT&CK repository
was utilized using the Structured Information Expression (STIX) serialization and
language format (OASIS, 2017).
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Part II
Related Work
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2. RELATED WORK
Related work for this thesis falls into three main categories: Cyber threat
intelligence, open-source intelligence (OSINT), and machine learning. In the following
sections, we will review each of these topics briefly. In Chapter 3 we will demonstrate
how all three are combined in RedAI to automatically classify CTI data.
2.1 CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE (CTI)
Currently, for organizations to provide proper cyber security risk mitigation, they
must develop many different strategies and approaches to combat the increasingly
complex adversary threat field (The MITRE Corporation, 2018). Part of the solution is
utilizing Cyber Threat Intelligence.
FireEye defines cyber threat intelligence as the following:
"Evidence-based knowledge about adversaries – their motives, intents, capabilities,
enabling environments and operations – focused on an event, series of events or
trends, and providing a decision advantage to the defender."

Through this definition, CTI has a strong focus on adversaries and their behaviors,
due to attacks and defense actions being executed because of human interaction. By
taking this approach to defining CTI, it enables a high-level focus on the attackers
themselves rather than the low-level techniques that they use. By doing so, this enables
organizations to implement proactive defenses based on their adversary’s intents and
capabilities.
For CTI, FireEye defines the difference between information (which often is not
actionable) and intelligence (which often includes content which makes it actionable).
Information, for example might include a malicious IP address or malware hash
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signature. These alone may help an organization in its defense, but that information is too
low-level to form an intelligence-drive defense posture. Intelligence includes information
but has added analysis, evaluation, relation, and context. This can include how malware
is used from a strategic standpoint, an APT's preferred set of malware tools, the types of
industries an APT target, and so on (FireEye, 2021).
Below is a table comparison provided by FireEye that shows the different
properties of information and intelligence (FireEye, 2021).
TABLE 1 INFORMATION VS. INTELLIGENCE
Information

Intelligence

Raw, unfiltered

Processed, sorted

Unevaluated

Evaluated and interpreted by an analyst

Aggregated from virtually every source Aggregated from tailored, reliable sources
May be true, false, misleading, relevant Accurate, timely, complete as possible,
or irrelevant
assessed for relevancy
Not actionable

Actionable

CTI requires a contextual perspective and has a strong focus on analyzing the
results and effectiveness of the information that sits within that intelligence. This can
include past, present, and future tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Further, the
relationships between each defined piece of information may be linked together and
mapped to create a visual representation.
There have been efforts to develop cyber threat intelligence frameworks to better
classify attacks and assess risks across the global threat landscape. One of these
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frameworks is the MITRE ATT&CK framework, which provides a globally accessible
knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations
(The MITRE Corporation, 2018). Through ATT&CK, specific threat models and
methodologies can be developed to be used across the entire industry and community.
The purpose of ATT&CK is to allow sharing of CTI in an effective and open manner that
allows for better security across the industry.
ATT&CK, considered to be one of the leading industry standards for CTI
frameworks, was originally developed to improve detection of adversaries by utilizing
data and analytics. Throughout these efforts, there were four main issues that ATT&CK
sought to highlight:
•

Adversary behaviors. Focusing on adversary tactics and techniques allowed us to
develop analytics to detect possible adversary behaviors. Typical indicators such as
domains, IP addresses, file hashes, registry keys, etc. were easily changed by
adversaries and were only useful for point in time detection — they did not represent
how adversaries interact with systems, only that they likely interacted at some time.

•

Existing lifecycle models that did not fit. Existing adversary lifecycle and Cyber Kill
Chain concepts were too high-level to relate behaviors to defenses — the level of
abstraction was not useful to map TTPs to new types of sensors.

•

Applicability to real environments. TTPs need to be based on observed incidents to
show the work is applicable to real environments.

•

Common taxonomy. TTPs need to be comparable across different types of adversary
groups using the same terminology.

9
It is apparent how the objectives of ATT&CK align with how FireEye defines CTI.
By focusing on adversaries, rather than low-level tactics, common and standardized
models can be built to be tailored to real-world use cases and aligned with data and
analytics. By focusing on these key themes, MITRE has found that intelligence focused
solutions can be developed that provide more effective strategies to defense postures
across the globe.

2.2 OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT)
There are many different forms of data and intelligence throughout the world's
technological ecosystem. Because of this vast array of data, there are many different
methods that can be used to gather the data and develop intelligence. The following are
the industry defined intelligence gathering disciplines:
TABLE 2 INTELLIGENCE GATHERING DISCIPLINES
Discipline

Abbreviation Description

Human Intelligence

HUMINT

Gathered from a person.

Geospatial Intelligence GEOINT

Gathering from satellite and aerial photography
or mapping/terrain data.

Measurement and
Signature Intelligence

MASINT

Gathered from an array of distinctive
characteristics. Can be further split into
different disciplines.

Open-Source
Intelligence

OSINT

Gathered from open sources.

Signals Intelligence

SIGINT

Gathered from interception of signals.

Technical Intelligence

TECHINT

Gathered from analysis of weapons and
equipment.
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Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is the most broadly defined, and widely used, form
of intelligence (Air Force Institute of Technology, 2007). It is often misunderstood and
improperly used throughout technological solutions. According to U.S. public law, opensource intelligence has the following characteristics (Richelson, 2016):
•

Produced from publicly available information.

•

Collected, analyzed, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience.

•

Addresses a specific intelligence requirement.
The main characteristic is that it is publicly available, meaning that anyone can

consume the information. It further allows for collecting, analyzing, and making
decisions based on the OSINT in an intelligence context. OSINT sources can be divided
into different categories based on the source of information (Richelson, 2016):
TABLE 3 OSINT CATEGORIES
Category

Examples

Media

Newspapers, magazines, radio

Internet

Online publications, blogs, social media

Public Government Data

Reports, budgets, websites, directories

Professional and Academic
Publications

Journals, conferences, academic papers

Commercial Data

Commercial imagery, assessments, and
databases

Grey Literature

Technical reports, working papers, newsletters
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Within the realm of cyber security, OSINT can be gathered from many different
sources: social media and blog posts, threat reports, and identified threat objects like
malware.
OSINT collection can be achieved in two ways, passive or active. Passive
collection is performed by using threat intelligence platforms to combine threat feeds into
a single location for consumption. Active collection is performed by using techniques to
query specific targets of information. Active collection is best utilized when the use-case
is very specifically defined.
Cyber threat intelligence sources are the origin that the intelligence you have
collected came from. A feed is a collection of intelligence from many sources typically of
the same type of intelligence. These open-source feeds can be queried and consumed,
which allows for them to be directly built into solutions and systems (Recorded Future,
2017).
Further, an intelligence platform is the system that organizes feeds into a stream
of intelligence. These platforms pull intelligence from OSINT feeds making it more
efficient for consumption across many different areas. These platforms can deliver feeds
via serialized methods like STIX or TAXII (OASIS, 2017). Lastly, there are intelligence
providers which are the organizations or entities that produce intelligence. An example of
a provider, applicable to this thesis's work, is the MTIRE ATT&CK repository.
Open-sourced platforms are relatively new within the cyber security field but
provide great benefits to the community. These benefits allow thousands of feeds to be
combined into a single consumable stream in standardized formats. By building solutions
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around open-sourced platforms, consumers can have access to large amounts of data that
have already been organized and serialized, which allows the heavy lifting of OSINT data
collection to be mitigated and streamlined (Recorded Future, 2017).

2.3 MACHINE LEARNING
Machine learning (ML) is the study of computer algorithms that improve
automatically through experience. ML is classified as a subset of artificial intelligence
(AI). ML algorithms work by building models on training data to make predictions
without being explicitly programmed to do so. ML algorithms can be applied to an
extremely wide variety of use cases but are best suited for scenarios where it is difficult
or inefficient to develop conventional algorithms to perform the desired tasks (Géron).
FIGURE 1 MACHINE LEARNING SOLUTION DEVELOPMENT (GÉRON)

The benefits of machine learning are typically best realized when the problems at
hand require a lot of hard code or manual tuning like with long rule lists. Further,
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machine learning algorithms are efficient at solving complex problems that may contain a
lot of data or need to be able to adapt to new data (Mitchell, Machine Learning, 1997).
Machine learning solutions can be broken down into two types: supervised or
unsupervised. Supervised machine learning relies on labeling data which is fed into the
algorithm that includes the desired solution. It maps an input to an output based on
supplied examples. It does this by analyzing a set of training data and produces an
inferred function that can then be used for mapping new examples. From here, the
algorithm can generalize from the supplied training data to unseen situations, which can
be measured statistically by evaluating the generalization error (Mitchell, Artificial
Intelligence: A Modern Approach, Third Edition, 1997).
Unsupervised machine learning is when the data is not tagged or labeled. The idea
is that the algorithm will self-organize itself and capture patterns within the data and
perform clustering strategies to make predictions. The focus of this thesis is on
supervised learning, as OSINT data suits this strategy best (Géron).
For supervised learning, there are a wide variety of algorithms that can be chosen,
each with their own strengths and weaknesses. No algorithm works best for all tasks and
it is vital that different algorithms are considered and have their effectiveness evaluated
to the problem at hand.
The most widely used supervised learning algorithms are:
•

Support-vector machines

•

Linear regression

•

Logistic regression
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•

Naïve Bayes

•

Linear Discriminant analysis

•

Decision trees

•

K-nearest neighbor algorithm

•

Neural networks

•

Similarity learning
Along with determining the best algorithm for a problem, there are other factors

to consider. Bias-variance tradeoff is the process for determining the threshold based on
training data sets to combat bias and variance. The prediction error is related to the bias
summed with the variance. If an algorithm exhibits low bias, it may be more flexible, and
it can fit each training set of data differently which causes high variance. Further, it is
important to determine the amount of training data used which is to be considered in
comparison with how complex the true function is. In other words, if the true function is
simple, an inflexible (high bias) algorithm can learn from a small amount of training data.
If the data is very complex and has many different behaviors or interactions, a large
amount of data is required with a flexible algorithm (low bias) (Géron).
Noise also needs to be considered when developing a machine learning solution.
If the output has low accuracy (often incorrect) then the algorithm should not find a
function that exactly matches the training examples. If the data is fit too closely it causes
overfitting. This can be caused if there are no errors, noise, when building your learning
algorithm.
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A key part of a supervised approach is feature engineering. This is the process of
selecting the features within your data to train on. For example, if your data is animals, a
feature would be "type of animal" which could equal "cat". Your features should be
relevant to the task at hand. Features can be extracted which is the process of combining
features to produce more useful complex features to train on (Stanford University, 2019).
Finally, machine learning solutions need to be tested and validated. To build a
learning model, it is best to split your data into two sets, a training set and test set. A
typical ratio is 80% training data and 20% test data; however, this can be tailored to fit
the problem and algorithm. If there is a low training error and high generalization,
overfitting is typically occurring (Géron).
Implementing a working machine learning algorithm can be challenging. Below is a
typical framework to follow when designing a solution:
1. Frame the problem at hand
2. Collect data
3. Explore the data to gain insights
4. Prepare the data for use with ML algorithms
5. Explore and evaluate different learning models
6. Fine-tune the model
7. Evaluate the solution
Because of the nature of open-source intelligence (OSINT) for this thesis, natural
language processing (NLP) must also be considered. NLP is used to understand structure
and meaning of human language by analyzing large amounts of data, thus allowing the
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computer to under the contents of a natural language data source. Through the analysis of
syntax, semantic, pragmatics, and morphology, machine learning algorithms can be built
to solve problems related to human language (Bird, 2009).
Natural language processing allows for many benefits to be realized through a
machine learning solution. Including:
•

Performing large scale analysis such as unstructured text data

•

Automate processes in real-time

•

Tailoring NLP tools to the task like criteria and industry-specific language
Natural language processing is performed by transforming text into associates that the

model can understand. This process is called text vectorization. Statistical analysis is then
used to build a dictionary to determine which features best represent the identified text.
The more language data fed into a NLP algorithm, the better the analysis will be (Yse,
2019).
One of the key steps in NLP is tokenization. This process is conducted by breaking
unstructured text into tokens that can then be used for model development. Through these
tokens, text can be used in an objectified programmatic sense and fed into the solution.
Another way of thinking of this is "building meaning" from the text.
Lastly, when dealing with large amounts of unstructured text it is important to
perform certain procedures to make sure that the text being fed into the machine learning
model is as clean as possible. In other words, we do not want to feed in unnecessary data
into our model, which can skew the model's fit given the problem. Below are outlines of
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steps to be performed in an NLP pipeline (Geitgey, 2018). The result are data structures
representing text that are then fed into the machine learning algorithm.
•

Sentence segmentation: break apart unstructured text into separate sentences.

•

Tokenization: break sentences into separate words.

•

PoS Tagging: guessing the part of speech (noun, verb, adjective).

•

Lemmatization: identifying different word forms.

•

Stop Word Removal: removing filler words (ex: "and", "the", "a").

•

Dependency Parsing: how words relate to each other.

•

Noun Phrases: grouping words that represent a single idea.

•

Named Entity Recognition: label nouns or real-world objects.

•

Coreference Resolution: (optional) identifying related words based on context.
FIGURE 2 NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING PIPELINE (GEITGEY, 2018)
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3.0 REDAI
For this thesis we developed a working, real-world focused, solution that can test,
evaluate, and answer the research questions that have been posed. This working solution
has been named RedAI and was developed using the Python 3 programing language
along with accompaniment from numerous Python libraries. By building a working and
demonstrable product, this thesis is able to clearly articulate its findings in a dynamic and
testable manner. Further, this method of research allows others to further develop the
work and evaluate the findings themselves. Lastly, this solution allows these findings to
be dynamic and not statically locked in time. The data used throughout the solution can
be modified for different use-cases or time-related evolution.
Code for this work has been released under an open-source license and can be
accessed at the GitHub repository:
https://github.com/lukeanoel/redAI/tree/main/redAI

3.1 CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE
3.1.1 MITRE ATT&CK OVERVIEW
To realize CTI into RedAI's design, the MITRE ATT&CK framework,
specifically MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise, was utilized as a foundation. MITRE
ATT&CK can be leveraged as a taxonomy as well as a useful data repository. ATT&CK
for Enterprise is an adversary model and framework for describing the actions an
adversary may take to compromise and operate within an enterprise network. By utilizing
the model, an organization can characterize and describe post-compromise behavior that
has been observed. Information on adversaries has been gathered through MITRE
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research as well as penetration testing and red teaming. The result is a knowledgebase
that characterizes activities adversaries use against enterprise networks (The MITRE
Corporation, 2021).
MITRE ATT&CK represents a large knowledge base of adversarial techniques
which are offensively oriented actions performed by attackers. As outlined in previous
sections of this thesis, the focus is on adversary behavior, not on low-level details like
malware and tools themselves, but on how they are used within context. Techniques are
organized into a set of tactics that explain each technique. Techniques provide details on
how the technique works which provides context.
Tactics explain the "why" of a technique. This is the objective or goal the attacker
has in-mind when performing an action. Tactics are high-level contextual categories.
While techniques represent "how" an attacker achieves an objective (The MITRE
Corporation, 2018).
One of the key features of ATT&CK that is used in this thesis is the relationship between
tactics and techniques. This relationship is visually demonstrated via the ATT&CK
Matrix.
Example: The tactic Persistence contains techniques including Account Manipulation,
BITS Jobs, and External Remote Services. Each one of these techniques can be used to
achieve Persistence.
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FIGURE 3 MITRE ATT&CK MATRIX

Further, techniques can be broken down into sub-techniques which describe how,
in more detail, the behaviors are performed. For the sake of this thesis, there were no
distinctions made between techniques and sub-techniques, all techniques were treated
equally.

3.1.2 ATT&CK & CTI INTEGRATION
One of the key benefits of using ATT&CK as a framework is its ability to
integrate with cyber threat intelligence (CTI). ATT&CK's repository contains
documented information on adversary group behavior profiles which are developed from
open-source intelligence. Groups are then further documented by how they have used
techniques in real-world scenarios to achieve their goals. These instances are classified as
procedures. Analyzing procedures allows proactive defense by seeing how adversaries
performed in the real-world, which allows organizations to trace their steps and
implement risk management (Ghaith Huasri, 2017).
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By integrating a solution with ATT&CK, we can make use of its data repository
of cyber threat intelligence. Within this repository, is a large collection of information
following the ATT&CK Matrix. MITRE makes all this information openly accessible via
their website or by accessing it through their maintained GitHub repository. This
information has been collected by MITRE from many different sources and centralized
into one location. This information has been analyzed, vetted, and tied together under the
wholistic intelligence approach (The MITRE Corporation, 2021).
This allows for anyone to be able to query the ATT&CK repository for a specific
adversary group (or all groups) and find the techniques they have used throughout their
observed actions, as well as the names of tools and malware they have used. Further, each
one of these breakdowns provides a detailed description of how the group specifically
used the technique or tool within that identified scenario. These descriptions have great
value and serve as the foundation for this thesis's work.
For example, MITRE has defined Group APT1 as having a description of: "APT1 is a
Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department,
commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398."
Further, ATT&CK then contains the 20 different types of techniques that APT1
has been observed using. These techniques then give a detailed description tailored to
APT1's use case. An example of how APT1 has used the technique System Service
Discovery in the real-world: “APT1 used the commands net start and tasklist to get a
listing of the services on the system."
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ATT&CK also contains the known types of software that groups have been found
to be using. Software consists of tools as well as malware. Each piece of software within
ATT&CK also has its own description so that the consumer can get a better description
of the software. More importantly, ATT&CK maps the techniques that each piece of
software realized tailored to the specific group. That is, software can realize many
different techniques, but for cyber threat intelligence it is important to know how each
group specifically uses the software.
RedAI utilizes the following ATT&CK concepts: Techniques, Mitigations,
Groups, and Software. Tactics are not considered as they are too high level for any real
analysis.
ATT&CK consists of several different concepts to objectify its data repository.
Below is a table outlining those concepts. Each concept has a respective ID variation that
is used to identify concepts. This is ID is unique to each object within a concept (The
MITRE Corporation, 2021).
TABLE 4 MITRE ATT&CK CONCEPTS
ATT&CK
Concept

Description

ID
Format

Technique

Represent “how” an adversary achieves a tactical objective by Txxxx
performing an action

Mitigation

Represent security concepts and classes of technologies that
can be used to prevent a technique or sub-technique from
being successfully executed

Mxxxx

Group

Known adversaries that are tracked by public and private
organizations and reported on in threat intelligences reports

Gxxxx

Software

Represent an instantiation of a technique or sub-technique.
Software is broken out into two high-level categories: tools
and malware.

Sxxxx
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3.1.3 STRUCTURED THREAT INFORMATION EXPRESSION (STIX)
Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) is a method in which to share
cyber threat information. Historically, sharing information has proven to be inefficient
and unstandardized. Information exchanged between providers and consumers is often
inconsistent and expresses little detail and flexibility. Because of these factors, it is often
hard to consume the information and integrate it into existing systems or solutions.
Because of this, the industry has relied heavily on unstructured text exchanges for
intelligence sharing, which has obvious difficulties for machines to understand. STIX
aims to enable widespread consumption of information by providing common
mechanisms for addressing threat information (OASIS, 2017).
STIX, by design, is an openly developed language for the characterization and
communication of standardized cyber threat information. Through this language, cyber
threats can be analyzed, specified, and shared in a unified fashion. STIX's design allows a
large set of threat information to be collected, including:
•

Cyber observables

•

•

Indicators

•

Incidents

•

Cyber Attack Campaigns

•

Adversary TTPs

•

Cyber Threat Actors

•

Exploit targets

Courses of Action
(remedies or mitigations)

(adversaries or groups)

STIX Domain Objects (SDOs) allow for the actual relationship building and
sharing of cyber threat intelligence. Each SDO contains property and relationship
information. Property information includes common properties (type, ID, labels, etc.) and
relationship information includes embedded relationships to other SDOs (OASIS, 2017).
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STIX version 2.1, which was used for the work in this thesis, defines 18 STIX Domain
Objects (SDOs).
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TABLE 5 STIX DOMAIN OBJECTS
Name

Description

Attack Pattern A type of TTP that describe ways that adversaries attempt to
compromise targets.
Campaign

A grouping of adversarial behaviors that describes a set of malicious
activities or attacks (sometimes called waves) that occur over a period
of time against a specific set of targets.

Course of
Action

A recommendation from a producer of intelligence to a consumer on the
actions that they might take in response to that intelligence.

Grouping

Explicitly asserts that the referenced STIX Objects have a shared
context, unlike a STIX Bundle (which explicitly conveys no context).

Identity

Actual individuals, organizations, or groups (e.g., ACME, Inc.) as well
as classes of individuals, organizations, systems or groups (e.g., the
finance sector).

Indicator

Contains a pattern that can be used to detect suspicious or malicious
cyber activity.

Infrastructure Represents a type of TTP and describes any systems, software services
and any associated physical or virtual resources intended to support
some purpose (e.g., C2 servers used as part of an attack, device or server
that are part of defense, database servers targeted by an attack, etc.).
Intrusion Set

A grouped set of adversarial behaviors and resources with common
properties that is believed to be orchestrated by a single organization.

Location

Represents a geographic location.

Malware

A type of TTP that represents malicious code.

Malware
Analysis

The metadata and results of a particular static or dynamic analysis
performed on a malware instance or family.

Note

Conveys informative text to provide further context and/or to provide
additional analysis not contained in the STIX Objects, Marking
Definition objects, or Language Content objects which the Note relates
to.

Observed
Data

Conveys information about cyber security related entities such as files,
systems, and networks using the STIX Cyber-observable Objects
(SCOs).

Opinion

An assessment of the correctness of the information in a STIX Object
produced by a different entity.

Report

Collections of threat intelligence focused on one or more topics, such as
a description of a threat actor, malware, or attack technique, including
context and related details.
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Threat Actor

Actual individuals, groups, or organizations believed to be operating
with malicious intent.

Tool

Legitimate software that can be used by threat actors to perform attacks.

Vulnerability

A mistake in software that can be directly used by a hacker to gain
access to a system or network.
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TABLE 6 STIX DOMAIN OBJECT RELATIONSHIPS
Source
attackpattern
attackpattern
attackpattern
attackpattern
campaign

Type
targets

Target
Source
vulnerability intrusionset
targets
identity
intrusionset
uses
malware
intrusionset
uses
tool
intrusionset
attributed- intrusion-set intrusionto
set
campaign attributed- threat-actor intrusionto
set
campaign targets
identity
malware
campaign targets
vulnerability malware
campaign uses
attackmalware
pattern
campaign uses
malware
malware
campaign uses
tool
threatactor
coursemitigates attackthreatof-action
pattern
actor
coursemitigates malware
threatof-action
actor
coursemitigates tool
threatof-action
actor
coursemitigates vulnerability threatof-action
actor
indicator indicates
attackthreatpattern
actor
indicator indicates
campaign
threatactor
indicator indicates
intrusion-set tool
indicator indicates
malware
tool
indicator indicates
threat-actor
indicator indicates
tool

Type
attributed-to

Target
threat-actor

targets

identity

targets

vulnerability

uses
uses

attackpattern
malware

uses

tool

targets
targets
uses

identity
vulnerability
tool

variant-of
attributed-to

malware
identity

impersonates identity
targets

identity

targets

vulnerability

uses
uses

attackpattern
malware

uses

tool

targets
targets

identity
vulnerability
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Below is an example visualization of a relationship between multiple SDOs. In
this example, a Campaign is being attributed to a Threat Actor, both of which were
indicated by an Indicator. That campaign then targets a Vulnerability.

FIGURE 4 IDENTIFYING A THREAT ACTOR STIX EXAMPLE (OASIS-OPEN, N.D.)

Below is an example of a specific attack-pattern form of spear phishing that references
CAPEC. As shown, there are three SDOs, one for the attack-pattern, one for the intrusion-set
(adversary), and one for the relationship connecting to the two (OASIS, 2017).
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FIGURE 5 STIX ATTACK-PATTERN EXAMPLE
[
{
"type": "attack-pattern",
"id": "attack-pattern--7e33a43e-e34b-40ec-89da-36c9bb2cacd5",
"created": "2016-05-12T08:17:27.000Z",
"modified": "2016-05-12T08:17:27.000Z",
"name": "Spear Phishing as Practiced by Adversary X",
"description": "A particular form of spear phishing where the attacker claims that the
target had won a contest, including personal details, to get them to click on a link.",
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "capec",
"id": "CAPEC-163"
}
]
},
{
"type": "relationship",
"id": "relationship--57b56a43-b8b0-4cba-9deb-34e3e1faed9e",
"created": "2016-05-12T08:17:27.000Z",
"modified": "2016-05-12T08:17:27.000Z",
"relationship_type": "uses",
"source_ref": "intrusion-set--0c7e22ad-b099-4dc3-b0df-2ea3f49ae2e6",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--7e33a43e-e34b-40ec-89da-36c9bb2cacd5"
},
{
"type": "intrusion-set",
"id": "intrusion-set--0c7e22ad-b099-4dc3-b0df-2ea3f49ae2e6",
"created": "2016-05-12T08:17:27.000Z",
"modified": "2016-05-12T08:17:27.000Z",
"name": "Adversary X"
}
]

3.1.4 STIX & MITRE ATT&CK
This section describes how this thesis programmatically uses MITRE ATT&CK's
data repository by implementing and extending the STIX format. ATT&CK can be
enabled by STIX by using some predefined STIX objects as well as creating some
custom STIX objects. Below is a table mapping ATT&CK concepts to the STIX Object
type used throughout this thesis's work. Note, that the STIX language version 2.1
contains more object types than mapped below. However, these are the only object types
used throughout this thesis as they are the only ones utilized by ATT&CK's repository.
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TABLE 7 ATT&CK TO STIX MAPPING
ATT&CK
Concept

STIX Object Type

Matrix

X-mitre-matrix

Tactic

X-mitre-tactic

Technique

Attack-pattern

Sub-technique

Attack-pattern where x_mitre_is_subtechnique = true

Procedure

Relationship where relationship_type = "uses" and target_ref is
attack-pattern

Mitigation

Course-of-action

Group

Intrusion-set

Software

Malware or Tool

While ATT&CK maintains unique IDs for each object in its repository, each
STIX objects also possess a unique ID. These IDs are unique and allow for effective
retrieval and reference to STIX objects programmatically. These IDs are different and
need to be treated as such (The MITRE Corporation, 2021).
Relationships are the key component to relating ATT&CK objects to one another.
This is performed by utilizing the STIX Relationship object. Relationships convey a
wholistic picture of events and allow for a more informed intelligence posture. Below is
an example of a relationship scenario. In this example, the relationships between a
specific group, it is used tools/malware, the techniques performed, and the corresponding
mitigations are shown (The MITRE Corporation, 2018). Within the box images are the
name of the corresponding STIX object. Relationships cannot be revoked; however, they
can be considered revoked if one of the objects they reference is revoked. This factor is
important in the event groups, mitigations, techniques, or tools become deprecated and no
longer form good intelligence by referencing them. Further, STIX Relationships allow for
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a description field, which contains unstructured text information that provides context to
the relationship between the objects (OASIS, 2017).

FIGURE 6 ATT&CK & STIX RELATIONSHIP VISUAL (THE MITRE CORPORATION,
2017)

3.2 OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
For the work in this thesis, OSINT is focused on the collected material within
MITRE ATT&CK's data repository. This repository is globally accessible to anyone and
can be viewed via their website. This intelligence has been gathered for use by the private
sector, government, and cybersecurity product and service community (FireEye, 2021).
This information is routinely maintained and kept up to date. Further, MITRE strives to
make sure the information and resulting intelligence is of high quality and centralized to
the cyber security field, which is typically is not common with other OSINT sources
(Ang, 2020).
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MITRE's intelligence within ATT&CK is a result of much of their own efforts
and research as well as dozens of different well-known entities within the cyber security
industry. With these factors in mind, MTIRE and ATT&CK are highly beneficial OSINT
resources to take advantage of for this work.

3.2.1 COLLECTION
MITRE makes the ATT&CK data repository globally accessible by anyone. This
information can be viewed manually via their website which also allows for the
possibility for web scraping. MITRE also makes all their data accessible via a maintained
GitHub repository. Through this repository they have all the data categorized by
ATT&CK concept in STIX format which can be easily downloaded via JSON files.
These JSON files contain the bundle of STIX SDOs which contain all needed
information for the work in this thesis (descriptions, names, ATT&CK IDs).
For the work of this thesis, the JSON files were downloaded and integrated into
the working RedAI solution. The following table breaks down the figures for data
obtained from the data repository (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise, 2021).
TABLE 8 ATT&CK DATA COLLECTED
ATT&CK Category Data Objects Collected
Groups

112

Mitigations

208

Techniques

392

Software

428

Relationships

1349
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The ease it which it is to collect this amount of valuable intelligence highlights the
benefits of working with ATT&CK. This large amount of collection was performed
seamlessly while following industry standardized formats that can be flexibly integrated
into the solution.

3.2.2 CONSUMPTION
With the cyber threat intelligence collected in STIX format, programmatic
methods were developed to convert this format into more usable data constructs to
integrate with machine learning libraries. To do this, each ATT&CK object's
corresponding STIX SDO was processed, with desired fields extracted. After this
process, fields were extracted from the STIX SDOs that were required for this work.
These fields include ATT&CK type, ATT&CK name, and description.
After extraction, all the data is stored in CSV format since most machine learning
libraries take CSVs as input.

3.3 A MACHINE LEARNING SOLUTION
There were numerous key libraries utilized throughout this work to provide
machine learning and natural language processing functionality. These key libraries are
highlighted in Table 9.
TABLE 9 PYTHON LIBRARIES UTILIZED (SCIKIT-LEARN) (PANDAS) (NLTK PROJECT,
2021)
Library

Description

SciKit
Learn

Scikit-learn is an open source machine learning library that supports
supervised and unsupervised learning. It also provides various tools for
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model fitting, data preprocessing, model selection and evaluation, and many
other utilities.
Pandas

Pandas is a fast, powerful, flexible and easy to use open source data analysis
and manipulation tool,
built on top of the Python programming language.

NLTK

NLTK (Natural Language Toolkit) is a leading platform for building Python
programs to work with human language data.

3.3.1 APPROACH
With the intelligence now collected, and the cyber threat intelligence architecture
understood, the next step is developing a solution to demonstrate the research. The issue
at hand is being able to demonstrate how machine learning can be utilized to effectively
classify cyber threat intelligence. To get to this result, certain qualities of the intelligence
need to be analyzed.
Each ATT&CK object obtained contains a type (Group, Technique, etc.) along
with an unstructured text form description. This description is going to be the key feature
used to build the machine learning models. These descriptions define each ATT&CK
object in detail and link them to a real-world observation (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise,
2021).
FIGURE 7 EXAMPLE GROUP DESCRIPTION
[APT19] is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries,
including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high
tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign
was used to target seven law and investment firms. Some analysts track and
[Deep Panda] as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if
the groups are the same.

FIGURE 8 EXAMPLE MALWARE DESCRIPTION
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[CARROTBAT] is a customized dropper that has been in use since at least 2017.
has been used to install and has infrastructure overlap with.

The goal of the machine learning solution is to be able to take in cyber threat
intelligence data, and by analyzing the unstructured text of their descriptions, be able to
accurately classify what type of ATT&CK object the intelligence falls under.

3.3.2 SYSTEM DESIGN OVERVIEW
Figure 9 shows the system design overview highlighting the entire pipeline of
RedAI. This view shows how RedAI utilizes a microservice architecture approach to
achieve its execution. Further, this overview shows the roles of each service as well as
their placement in the process chain.
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FIGURE 9 REDAI PIPELINE
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3.3.3 DATA EVALUATION
A great deal of unstructured text data has been gathered from the MITRE
ATT&CK repository. Evaluating this data is a key step and being able to prepare it
efficiently to be used to build the machine learning models. Further, it is important for
any machine learning solution to fully understand what your data represents and contains.
Data is the foundation of any machine learning solution, and without a good grasp of the
data the solution is set up for failure.
TABLE 10 ATT&CK FEATURES OF FOCUS
ATT&CK
Name

ATT&CK Type

Description

The name of
the ATT&CK
object

The classification of the The unstructured text field explaining
ATT&CK object (Group, contextual information about the
Software, etc.)
ATT&CK object. This field can be just a
sentence to multiple paragraphs.

This data evaluation process is a key enabler of the data cleaning process to be
performed. By analyzing the data obtained, we can see that there are many unwanted
pieces of text data. Figure 8 is an example of a Group's (Axiom) description extracted
from the ATT&CK repository in raw form of text with spaces removed.
FIGURE 10 GROUP DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE
[Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001)isacyberespionagegroupsuspected
tobeassociatedwiththeChinesegovernment.ItisresponsiblefortheOperationSMNca
mpaign.(Citation:NovettaAxiom)Thoughboththisgroupand[WinntiGroup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/
G0044)usethemalware[WinntiforWindows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S01
41),thetwogroupsappeartobedistinctbasedondifferencesinreportingonthegroups'T
TPsandtargeting.(Citation:KasperskyWinntiApril2013)(Citation:KasperskyWinn
tiJune2015)(Citation:NovettaWinntiApril2015)
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This example is a good representation for all the raw unstructured text that was
collected by ATT&CK. As can be seen, there are many characteristics of this data that
are not of value for building the ML models. For starters, URL reference links to either
MTIRE's website pages or to external references do not provide contextual value. While
important to know the sources of data, it does not provide any machine learning
tokenization value. Next, any references to citations are not needed for the same reasons.
Lastly, it was noticed that same malware descriptions have code samples or references.
The unstructured text denotes this code using HTML tags like <code>. These tags are not
valuable, however the text inside the tags is. Lastly, throughout this work it was deemed
necessary to convert all text to Unicode UTF-8, as some of the data pulled in was in an
improper format.
Another important realization was that some ATT&CK objects collected had
empty descriptions. These provide no value and are a hindrance to the solution, as the
remaining solution pipeline is expecting for there to be unstructured text information.
Other key evaluation notices are that there can sometimes be unstructured text references
to the group itself, other groups, other aliases, or possible malware used. These are
acceptable to leave in the unstructured text as they provide contextual information that
will help build better models for that specific ATT&CK type.
3.3.4 DATA CLEANING & PREPARATION
After the data collected from MITRE ATT&CK has been evaluated appropriately,
the data can now be cleaned and prepared to build models with. For this approach, the
entire MITRE repository will be used to develop training and test sets of data. The
training data set will be used to train the model. The test data set will be the means to test
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the accuracy of the model. Currently, it is not important to know the training and test
ratios, but it is important to know where those sets are coming from. Further, it is
important to know that when creating those data sets, the sets will be created using a
random approach, so that all data is treated equally.
To begin cleaning the data, RedAI iterates through the stored data checking for
empty description fields as well as duplicates. If any of these are found, they are
removed. The next step is to utilize regular expressions (regex) to remove all URLs,
citation references, and ATT&CK references. Also using regular expressions, all possible
<code> HTML tags are removed as well as new line and indentation tabs like '\n' and '\t'.
After all this is complete, the text is converted to Unicode UTF-8 format. After this
process is complete, RedAI is left with clean looking data that is intelligence focused.
After this initial cleaning, more general machine learning cleaning methods are
applied. To begin, all words are converted to lowercase, all punctuation is removed, and
stop words are removed. Stop word removal is important as stop words provide no added
value to the sentences themselves but are only needed to formulate English language
continuity. These are common words such as "a", "an", "the", and "in". The entire list of
stop words used for this work was referenced by the NLTK's list of English stop words.
After all this cleaning has been performed across the data, the data is stored for
later use to build the machine learning models. Below is a figure plot showing the totals
of each ATT&CK category.
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FIGURE 11 ATT&CK DATA OBJECTS COLLECTED

3.3.5 MODEL DEVELOPMENT
To be able to answer the research questions effectively, this thesis places a strong
focus on evaluating different strategies throughout the development of the machine
learning solution. These strategies include the train/test ratio, NLP procedures, and the
type of algorithm deemed the best fit.
Model development begins by following a bag of words approach towards our
data. Bag of words is taking in each document of unstructured text and ignoring the
placement of the words and placing an emphasis on frequency. For this work, Term
Frequency Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) is used. TF-IDF is a statistic to reflect
on the importance of a word within a collection. TF-IDF value increases as a word
appears more often in a document but is offset by the number of documents that contains
the word. This helps adjust for words that generally appear more frequently across the
whole spectrum (Rajaraman, 2011).
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FIGURE 12 TERM FREQUENCY FORMULA

A TF-IDF vector is calculated using the Scikit-Learn library with the following
properties:
•

Sublinear_df set to True to use logarithmic frequency

•

Min_df is the minimum amount of documents a word must be present in to be
kept, which is set to 3

•

Norm is set to 12, ensuring all feature vectors have a euclidian norm of 1.

•

Ngram_range is set to (1,2), this allows for consideration of both unigrams and
bigrams
FIGURE 13 TF-IDF VECTORIZER
TfidfVectorizer(sublinear_tf=True,min_df=3,norm='l2',encoding='latin-1',ngram_range=(1,2))

The next step in the process is to transform the Description feature of each
ATT&CK object into a vector of numbers. This assists with training supervised
classifiers. This gives a vector representation of the text, which allows us to train unseen
ATT&CK objects to make predictions on which ATT&CK type they fall under. After
this, everything has been prepared to develop models and evaluate their effectiveness.
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3.3.6 MODEL EVALUATION
The next step in model development is to benchmark different types of models and
evaluate their accuracy. The four models that will be benchmarked are:
•

Multinominal Naïve Bayes

•

Logistic Regression

•

Linear Support Vector Classification

•

Random Forest

This evaluation process included splitting the original ATT&CK dataset into the
training and test sets, developing the model using the SciKit-Learn Python library, and
evaluating the accuracy between all the models. Further, a combined boxplot and strip
plot approach was used for each ATT&CK category to determine the accuracy focuses on
the category per model. The accuracy is determined by feeding in the description features
of the test data set into each model, knowing where they belong, and seeing how accurate
the model classifies them (Géron).
For high-level analysis, it is sometimes important to analyze the most common
unigrams and bigrams for each type of classification within the training set. This gives an
overview of some common features, but also would indicate issues in data collection or
cleaning if there are noticeable features that are not of value.
TABLE 11 MOST COMMON UNIGRAMS & BIGRAMS
ATT&CK Type Most Correlated Unigrams Most Correlated Bigrams
Group

Threat

Group targeted

Group

Threat group
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Software

Relationship

Technique

Mitigation

Trojan

Access tool

Backdoor

Backdoor used

Adversaries

Threat group

Legitimate

Backdoor used

Adversary

Adversaries use

Adversaries

Adversaries abuse

Applocker

Whitelisting software

Privilege

Potentially malicious

FIGURE 14 GROUP BOX PLOT
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FIGURE 15 MITIGATIONS BOX PLOT

FIGURE 16 RELATIONSHIPS BOX PLOT
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FIGURE 17 SOFTWARE/MALWARE BOX PLOT

FIGURE 18 TECHNIQUES BOX PLOT
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As can be identified from the box plots shown above, the variation in accuracy
between each ATT&CK category is very limited, meaning that the mean accuracy for
each model for each ATT&CK category show no indication of certain categories creating
outlying results within certain models. This is as expected as the structure of data is
unstructured text, and each category followed the same text cleaning procedures.
To begin, the Naïve Bayes model was evaluated. Naïve Bayes is a family of
probabilistic classifiers based on Bayes' theorem. This classifier places a significance on
the independence between features (McCallum, 2019). For this work, the Multinominal
Naïve Bayes approach was used. As can be seen, Naïve Bayes performed similarly to
Logistic Regression except at a slightly lower mean accuracy of .831703.
Next, Random Forest algorithm was evaluated. Random Forest operates by
constructing multiple decision trees and then classifying the data and outputting the class
that is the mode of the classes (classification) or mean/average prediction (regression) of
the individual trees (TK, 1998). This model performed the weakest of all the algorithms;
however, it did have the less variance in accuracy with no outliers.
Following, Logistic Regression was evaluated. Logistic regression is a statistical
model that in its basic form uses a logistic function to model a binary dependent variable,
although many more complex extensions exist. In regression analysis, logistic regression
estimates the parameters of a logistic model (Tolles, 2016). This model performed well at
an accuracy of over 90%. However, as can be seen by the box plots, it had a weakness to
outliers.
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Lastly, Linear Support Vector Classification (SVC) was evaluated. Linear SVC is
similar to SVC, but it is implemented in terms of lib-linear, giving it more flexibility in
the choice of penalties and loss functions and should scale better to large numbers of
samples (Scikit-Learn). As can be noticed, Linear SVC had the highest mean accuracy of
all the models and had a weakness to only one noticeable outlier for each ATT&CK
object.
After performing these evaluations, Linear SVC was chosen as the best
performing model to use for this research. All work performed here after is under the use
of the Linear SVC model algorithm.
TABLE 12 MODEL ACCURACIES
Model Name

Mean Accuracy

LinearSVC

.936542

LogisticRegression

.908763

MultinomialNB

.831703

Random Forest

.695300

3.3.7 SOLUTION EVALUATION
While the previous section analyzed the results of our machine learning
implementation, it is important to utilize this result and compare it to the wholistic
problem at hand. In this section, the results will be analyzed at a lower level, still leaving
the larger conclusion to be presented in a later section.
As can be seen in the figure below, most of the predictions made by our model
visualize a linear heat map, which is the desired outcome. This shows that most of our
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predictions are being accurately categorized with our model. However, as can be seen
throughout there are some misclassifications.

FIGURE 19 MODEL PREDICTION ACCURACY HEATMAP

The only ATT&CK category with many misclassifications are the number of
predictions that are being classified as relationships when in reality they are malware. In
this case, it can be useful to analyze the descriptions of these malware types and try to
make assumptions as to why they may have been misclassified.

52

TABLE 13 MALWARE MISCLASSIFICATIONS
Actual ATT&CK
Type

Predicted ATT&CK
Type

Description

Malware

Relationship

is malware that was injected into a signed ver...

Malware

Relationship

is a loader component that has been observed l..

Malware

Relationship

is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid devel...

Malware

Relationship

is a malware platform that uses a modular appr...

Malware

Relationship

steals banking information through man-in-the-...

Malware

Relationship

is a software suite and network that provides ...

Malware

Relationship

is a malicious DLL that has been used by duri…

Malware

Relationship

is an automatic SQL Injection tool distributed...

Malware

Relationship

is a malware-as-a-service offered on the darkw...

Malware

Relationship

is a loader crafted to be launched via abuse o...

Malware

Relationship

can be used to find or change information with...

Malware

Relationship

is a Trojan used by to remotely execute
comma...

Malware

Relationship

is a kernel-mode that attempts to add victims...

Malware

Relationship

is a Web shell. It has been modified by actor…

Malware

Relationship

is a signature backdoor used by that is capab...

Malware

Relationship

is a kernel-mode rootkit used for cryptocurren...
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Certain assumptions can be made after reviewing the text that was misclassified,
but none of these can be for certain. First, these descriptions have two or one subjects,
which is a common feature that can be expected from relationships. Next, these typically
are more text heavy and have a connection between what the malware does and how it
has been used in the real world, again another feature of what we expect from
relationship descriptions.
Lastly, it is important to evaluate the final scores from all the ATT&CK types.
Below is a classification report with the following analysis points: precision, recall, f1score, and support. Precision shows that for each prediction for each ATT&CK type, how
often did it pick the correct one. Notably, groups and courses of action were predicted
with 100% precision, with the other types not far behind. Highly precise categories can
most likely be attributed to how unique their description feature is compared to the other
types. Recall is the percentage of all the types used for testing that were correctly placed
in their right classification. All performed well, however malware preformed the worst at
85%. This can be attributed to how diverse in features malware descriptions were. This
makes sense due to the many different types of malware as well as use cases.
Next to analyze are the f1-scores. F1-scores are the harmonic mean of the
precision and recall. This can serve as a good indicator of a total score, which all the
categories reflect 90% or above. Lastly, the support column is the number of instances
used for each ATT&CK category for testing. As a reminder, our train/test ratio was
80:20, so most of our data went towards training our model.
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TABLE 14 SOLUTION PREDICTION RESULTS
ATT&CK Type

Precision Recall F1-score Support

Group

1.00

0.89

0.94

28

Malware/Software

0.95

0.85

0.90

107

Technique

0.99

0.99

0.99

98

Relationship

0.95

0.99

0.97

349

Course of Action/Mitigation

1.00

0.92

0.96
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Further, the scores were compared with one another by calculating the averages.
In total, 634 ATT&CK objects were used for testing the machine learning model, and we
were met with highly accurate results with an average f1-score of 0.96. These scores are
even further highlighted by the fact that the text for each ATT&CK type came from the
same source, which typically results in less accurate results as the unstructured text can
be bias to the author and hard to differentiate. Below is a table showcasing our results,
along with the macro-average of the scores as well as a weighted average as the different
types had different amounts of objects. Lastly, all these results can be easily replicated by
anyone by utilizing the RedAI solution with this data or by experimenting with their own.

TABLE 15 WEIGHTED SOLUTION SUMMARY RESULTS
Precision Recall F1-score Support
Accuracy

n/a

n/a

0.96

634

Macro Average

0.98

0.93

0.95

634

Weight Average 0.96

0.96

0.96

634
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4. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
4.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1
Research Question 1 - How can the MITRE ATT&CK framework serve
organizations as a cyber threat intelligence (CTI) ontology?

The work in this thesis took a deep dive into the topic of cyber threat intelligence
and the current landscape in which organizations can consume and share this intelligence.
MITRE ATT&CK serves as a framework for describing post-compromise behavior that
has been observed in the wild. By utilizing MITRE ATT&CK, organizations can take
advantage of the research and intelligence gathering performed by a well-known
organization and model it across their own enterprise.
ATT&CK provides an ontology that allows organizations to focus on high-level
adversary behavior instead of low-level details. ATT&CK organizes techniques into sets
of tactics that provide context to the situations. This allows organizations to pivot their
focus from low-level defense maneuvers like IP blacklisting and instead utilize wholistic
defense measures that are tailored to the "why" of an adversary attack.
ATT&CK also maintains strong intelligence on known adversary groups and their
targeted industries. Organizations can analyze which adversary groups pertain to their
organizations, link their known tactics and techniques, and then proactively tailor their
cyber defense to those strategies. This method of defense allows organizations to be
proactive, efficient, and intelligent.
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4.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 2

Research Question 2 - Can open-source intelligence (OSINT) be a viable method for
collecting and consuming cyber threat intelligence (CTI)?

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is one of the most widely used forms of
intelligence gathering. It also is one of the most available sources of intelligence and
surrounds us both in the real and digital worlds. Being able to harness this vast array of
information has many benefits and can be applied to a diverse set of solutions.
One of the key issues with OSINT is it can be represented in many different forms
and is often not produced in formats that are easily consumable. Historically, OSINT
needs to be manually sifted and analyzed by humans which typically causes it to be an
inefficient and costly form of intelligence gathering. However, as the digital landscape
and need for OSINT has evolved, so has the methods in which we can store, share, and
consume it.
The Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) language provides a
common format for organizations to share and consume threat intelligence. STIX is open
source and free, which naturally eliminates any barrier of entry for those who want to
contribute and consume. All aspects of threat intelligence can be represented through
STIX data objects and can be visually represented for an analyst or stored as JSON to be
machine readable. This openness allows for organizations to integrate into tools and
solutions easily. It is because of these principles that STIX proves to be an excellent
enabler for OSINT.
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While having STIX as an option for OSINT, it does not inherently prove that
threat intelligence can still be effectively collected. This thesis proved this was possible
by the ease at which intelligence was collected from MITRE's ATT&CK data repository.
This data repository is the entirety of the ATT&CK intelligence framework all stored as
STIX objects. By using STIX, ATT&CK was able to link all its threat intelligence
research effectively to one another and easily consumable by anyone, globally. This
thesis demonstrated the ease and effectiveness of the OSINT collection and serves as a
demonstration of how organizations and entities can do the same.

4.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 3

Research Question 3 - Can machine learning prove to be an accurate and efficient
method for harnessing the benefits of a cyber threat intelligence ontology?

Machine learning can be applied to solve many difficult and complex problems
across a wide range of industries. These applications typically shine best when the
problems at hand require a lot of manual intervention or analysis by a human. These are
the current issues facing the cyber security landscape as there is such a large volume of
data and not enough analysts to analyze and make decisions from the data. These factors
are the recipe for a machine learning solution to be applied. However, this machine
learning solution needs to be a tangible result for organizations to reach. A proper
solution needs to be both accurate and effective for the problem at hand and needs to
show added benefit over the current-day manual approach.
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This thesis focused on the applicability of consuming unstructured OSINT threat
intelligence and leveraging machine learning models to be able to classify unknown
unstructured OSINT threat intelligence. This thesis was able to demonstrate extremely
accurate results while also comparing and visualizing the difference in model types.
Further, this solution demonstrated that a large amount of data proved to not be an issue
for the models as this solution dealt with thousands of artifacts of data of various types
and was able to predict accurately with an average F1-score of 95%. These working
demonstrations show that organizations can leverage machine learning, as well as natural
language processing, to efficiently classifying threat intelligence. Further, this thesis
showed that a machine learning model can be fed in training data that is cyber threat
intelligence specific. Even further, this solution's datasets were collected from data
sources that package their intelligence from real-world events, further emphasizing their
applicability. Lastly, the machine learning model, aligned with MITRE ATT&CK,
showed that a cyber threat intelligence ontology can be applied to solving complex
problems within the cyber defense landscape.

4.4 FUTURE WORK
One of the core themes and foundations of the work of this thesis is data. While it is
important for organizations to have a strong understanding of cyber threat intelligence
principles and frameworks, realizing these principles into tangible and beneficial
solutions is a daunting task. One of the key features of building better solutions is
developing larger and more robust data collection pipelines. It is vital that more and more
data be collected with focus on sharing and consumption.
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The work in this thesis can be further developed by utilizing more diverse and
higher volumes of data. There is a growing amount of OSINT feeds being made available
to the cyber security community. Examples of OSINT feeds include AlienVault’s Open
Threat Exchange (AlienVault, 2021), the FBI’s InfraGard (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, n.d.), and FireEye’s Threat Intelligence solutions (FireEye, 2021). Further,
custom tailored solutions can be developed as well by collecting intelligence using social
media sites, dark web sites, and tools like Shodan (Shodan, 2021).
Collecting more cyber threat intelligence data will increasingly make the machine
learning model smarter and able to predict more accurately. Next, even more diverse
datasets can be consumed by the solution. Collecting ATT&CK types from a diverse pool
of data streams will allow the machine learning model to be built from a stronger
foundation and can be applied to more diverse problems.
Lastly, machine learning is one of the fastest growing fields within computer
science. There are new libraries and strategies being released to the community which
provide even more capabilities. It was not long ago that many of the ML libraries utilized
in this thesis did not exist. As the machine learning field develops, so too can the models
they produce.
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